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A commentary on
Reinstatement of long-term memory following erasure of its behavioral and synaptic
expression in Aplysia
by Chen, S., Cai, D., Pearce, K., Sun, P. Y.-W., Roberts, A. C., and Glanzman, D. L. (2014). eLife
3:e03896. doi: 10.7554/eLife.03896
An article published at the end of last year by Chen et al. (2014) reported their revelatory work
with cultured Aplysia motor and sensory neurons which has led them to challenge the idea that
synaptic connectivity and conductivity form the basis of learning and memory in the brain. With
their paper Chen et al. have weighed in on a debate that has been raging in the cognitive sciences
for most of the field’s existence (Gallistel, 1998), namely the question of whether the brain should
or can reasonably be considered a representational-computational system.
In a relatively recent book, Gallistel and King (2009) demonstrated howwell-established findings
from computer science and (computational) cognitive science might influence our thinking about
computational processes in the brain. They make a very detailed and elaborate argument which
cannot adequately be reproduced here without distortion. Still, in essence, Gallistel and King argue
that the brain must somehow possess an architecture similar to that found in a von-Neumann
machine, that is adhere to the abstract architectural properties of a universal Turing machine. They
expound that an essential conceptual requirement of Turing machines, a read/write memory, has
been overlooked by neuroscientists and neurobiologists in their search for the locus of memory
in the brain, concluding that presently virtually nothing is actually known about how the brain
encodes information, stores and retrieves information from memory, and performs computations
on symbols.
Based on the work of Ramón yCajal and Sherrington, Donald Hebb made the at first merely
theoretical proposal that differences and changes in synaptic connectivity and strength might
constitute the basic mechanism of how information is stored in the brain (Glickstein, 2014).
The discovery of long-term potentiation (and subsequently long-term depression) provided
physiological confirmation for Hebb’s ideas about learning. The “key idea” behindHebbian learning
is that learning is associative in nature, meaning that learning essentially comes down to association
induced by simultaneous activity of neurons or absence thereof. Large branches of the cognitive
sciences have since followed this intuitive train of thought by deeming learning to be association,
arguing that so-called associative long-term potentiation provides the mind/brain’s mechanism
for learning and memory. This has led many cognitive scientists to argue against the idea of the
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mind/brain as a representational-computational system (e.g.,
Rumelhart et al., 1986).
Admittedly, Hebbian learning has an intuitive appeal, but
Gallistel and King (2009) as well as Gallistel and Matzel (2013)
have convincingly argued that we run into severe problems
when making synaptic conductance the locus of memory. Pavlov
already discovered that a multitude of experiential aspects in
combination determine the associative strength between two
stimuli. All different variables are mixed and encoded in a single
association. However, it is impossible to even approximately
determine the value of any of the variables that entered into
the original calculation, so that association is, in mathematical
terms, a many-one function. Given this many-to-one nature of
associative strengths, the only hope to regain useful information
from them is by doing away with Pavlov’s intent to discover
general “laws of association” and assuming that there are different
mapping rules (i.e. neurobiological processes) for every synapse.
Clearly, this is an unpleasant assumption that no researcher
wants to make. Furthermore, synaptic conductance is not
accessible to the computational processes assumed to be carried
out in neurons, supposedly addition of multiplicatively weighted
input signals (Kandel et al., 2013). We thus see a vast discrepancy
between what associative long-term potentiation is assumed to be
capable of doing and what it actually can do.
From the perspective of computational cognitive science it
follows that when looking for a mechanism that implements a
read/write memory in the nervous system, turning to synaptic
strength and connectivity patterns might be misleading. What
is more, synapses might already be too complex in terms of
implementing such an elementary function. As Gallistel and King
put it:
In the final analysis, however, our skepticism rests most strongly
on the fact that the synapse is a circuit-level structure, a structure
that it takes two different neurons and a great many molecules
to realize. It seems to us likely for a variety of reasons that the
elementary unit in the memory mechanism will prove to be a
molecular or sub-molecular structural unit. (2009, p. 282)
Based on the observation that every neuron actually performs
a rather stereotypical computational operation on its input
(Kandel et al., 2013), it seems likely that much more with
respect to memory is going on in the cell body (see Johansson
et al., 2014). Chen et al.’s (2014) work therefore provides some
further tentative confirmation for this “hunch” of Gallistel and
collaborators (Gallistel and King, 2009; Gallistel and Matzel,
2013; Gallistel and Balsam, 2014).
All in all, it seems that there indeed are two different processes
at work in learning and memory, as Chen et al. (2014) also point
out. While the exact details about both remain obscure, there
appears to be a dissociation between the way in which learning
occurs and how memory works. We do not know how the brain
implements a read/write memory, but there is good evidence that
it does. Similarly, there is ample and convincing evidence, also in
Chen et al. (2014), that synaptic conductivity and connectivity
play a role in regulating behavior. Consequently, it appears
that synaptic plasticity might not so much be a precondition
for learning as it is a consequence of it, so that the observed
rewiring of synaptic connections might constitute the brain’s way
of ensuring an “efficient,” or possibly even close to “optimal”
(Cherniak et al., 2004; Sporns, 2012), connectivity and therefrom
resulting activity pattern that is appropriate to environmental
(and presumably also “internal”) conditions. Synaptic plasticity
thus might be reinterpreted as a way of regulating behavior (i.e.,
activity and connectivity patterns) only after learning has already
occurred (i.e., after relevant information has been extracted from
the environment and stored in memory).
Extrapolating Chen et al.’s (2014) findings stemming from
work on Aplysia to claims about much more complex nervous
systems is, of course, speculative in nature, to say the least.
However, it seems to be no more speculative than the
almost universally accepted idea of the synapse being the
locus of memory. Similarly to Johansson et al. (2014), the
work of Chen et al. (2014) shows that (1) there is plenty
of “room” for the implementation of symbols other than
synapses, and (2) substantiates the understanding that the
network approach of connectionism might indeed best be seen
as an implementational theory (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988)
that still requires representation, computation, and a Turing
architecture (i.e., a read/write memory). Gallistel and Balsam
(2014) proclaimed that is was about time to rethink the neural
mechanisms of learning and memory, Chen et al.’s experimental
results add to the urgency of this claim.
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